Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor Network: Dynamics of Learning and Computations by O\u27Connor, Christopher M et al.
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Psychology Publications Psychology Department 
4-24-2009 
Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor Network: Dynamics of 
Learning and Computations 
Christopher M. O'Connor 
George S. Cree 
Ken McRae 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/psychologypub 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Citation of this paper: 
O'Connor, Christopher M.; Cree, George S.; and McRae, Ken, "Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor 
Network: Dynamics of Learning and Computations" (2009). Psychology Publications. 162. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/psychologypub/162 
Conceptual Hierarchies in a Flat Attractor Network:
Dynamics of Learning and Computations
Christopher M. O’Connor,a George S. Cree,b Ken McRaea
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London
bDepartment of Psychology, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto
Received 18 February 2008; received in revised form 18 February 2008; accepted 17 September 2008
Abstract
The structure of people’s conceptual knowledge of concrete nouns has traditionally been viewed
as hierarchical (Collins & Quillian, 1969). For example, superordinate concepts (vegetable) are
assumed to reside at a higher level than basic-level concepts (carrot). A feature-based attractor
network with a single layer of semantic features developed representations of both basic-level and
superordinate concepts. No hierarchical structure was built into the network. In Experiment and
Simulation 1, the graded structure of categories (typicality ratings) is accounted for by the flat
attractor network. Experiment and Simulation 2 show that, as with basic-level concepts, such a
network predicts feature verification latencies for superordinate concepts (vegetable <is nutritious>).
In Experiment and Simulation 3, counterintuitive results regarding the temporal dynamics of similar-
ity in semantic priming are explained by the model. By treating both types of concepts the same in
terms of representation, learning, and computations, the model provides new insights into semantic
memory.
Keywords: Superordinate concepts; Attractor networks; Temporal dynamics; Semantic memory
1. Introduction
When we read or hear a word, a complex set of computations makes its meaning
available. Some words refer to a set of objects or entities in our environment correspond-
ing to basic-level concepts such as chair, hammer, or bean, and thus refer to this level
of information (Brown, 1958). Others refer to more general superordinate classes, such
as furniture, tool, and vegetable, which encompass a wider range of possible referents.
The goal of this article is to use a feature-based attractor network to provide insight into
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how concepts at multiple ‘‘levels’’ might be learned, represented, and computed using an
architecture that is not hierarchical.
A large body of research has implicated distinct treatment of basic-level and superordi-
nate concepts. People are generally fastest to name objects at the basic level (Jolicoeur,
Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984), and participants in picture-naming tasks tend to use basic-level
labels (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Murphy and Smith (1982)
have demonstrated similar effects with artificial categories. In ethnobiological studies of
prescientific societies, the basic level (genus) is considered the most natural level of classifi-
cation in folk taxonomic structures of biological entities (Berlin, Breedlove & Raven,
1973), and it emerges first in the evolution of language (Berlin, 1972). In addition, the time
course of infants’ development of representations for basic-level and superordinate concepts
appears to differ (Rosch et al., 1976), with superordinates learned earlier than basic-level
concepts (Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 1991; Quinn & Johnson, 2000). Complementary
to this finding, during the progressive loss of knowledge in semantic dementia, basic-level
concepts often are affected prior to superordinates (Hodges, Graham, & Patterson, 1995;
Warrington, 1975). Thus, the way in which a concept is acquired, used, and lost depends
partly on its specificity. Such differences have motivated semantic memory models in which
basic-level and superordinate concepts are stored transparently at different levels of a
hierarchy.
1.1. Hierarchical network models
Collins and Quillian’s (1969) hierarchical network model was the first to capture differ-
ences between superordinate and basic-level concepts. They argued that concepts are orga-
nized in a taxonomic hierarchy, with superordinates at a higher level than basic-level
concepts, and subordinate concepts at the lowest level. Features (<is green>) are stored at
concept nodes, and the relations among concepts at different levels are encoded by ‘‘is-a’’
links. A central representational commitment was cognitive economy, so that features
should be stored only at the highest node in the hierarchy for which they were applicable to
all concepts below. An important processing claim was that it takes time to traverse nodes
and to search for features within nodes. Collins and Quillian presented data supporting both
cognitive economy and hierarchical representation. Given the model’s successes, differ-
ences between superordinate and basic-level concepts were thought to be characterized, par-
simoniously, and intuitively, by their location in a mental hierarchy.
Collins and Loftus (1975) extended this model in the form of spreading activation theory
to account for some of its limitations. First, in a strict taxonomic hierarchy, a basic-level
concept can have only one superordinate (Murphy & Lassaline, 1997). This proves problem-
atic for many concepts; for example, knife can be a weapon, tool, or utensil. Collins and
Loftus abandoned a strict hierarchical structure, allowing concept nodes from any level to
be connected to any other. Second, Collins and Quillian’s (1969) model was not designed to
account for varying goodness, or typicality, of the exemplars within a category (e.g., people
judge carrot to be a better example of a vegetable than is pumpkin). Numerous studies have
used typicality ratings to tap people’s knowledge of the graded structure of categories,
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showing that it systematically varies across a category’s exemplars (Rosch & Mervis,
1975). Collins and Loftus introduced a special kind of weight between basic-level and
superordinate nodes (criteriality) to reflect typicality. This theory has been implemented
computationally (Anderson, 1983), and it provides a comprehensive descriptive account of
a large body of data (Murphy & Lassaline, 1997).
One limitation of these models, however, is that no mechanism has been described that
determines which nodes are interconnected and what the strengths are on the connections.
Without such a mechanism, the models may be unfalsifiable. This limitation has motivated
researchers to instantiate new models in which weights between units are learned, and repre-
sentations are acquired through exposure to structured inputs and outputs.
1.2. Connectionist models of semantic memory
Most computational investigations of natural semantic categories conducted in the
past 25 years have been in the form of distributed connectionist models, and they have
focused mainly on basic-level concepts (Hinton & Shallice, 1991; McRae, 2004; Plaut,
2002; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004). This focus is reasonable given the
psychologically privileged status of the basic level. Consequently, when using models
in which word meaning is instantiated across a single layer of units, as is typical of
most connectionist models, it is not immediately obvious how to represent both basic-
level and superordinate concepts.
A few connectionist models have addressed this issue. Hinton (1981, 1986) provided the
first demonstration that they could code for superordinate-like representations across a sin-
gle layer of hidden units from exposure to appropriately structured inputs and outputs.
McClelland and Rumelhart (1985) showed that connectionist systems could develop internal
representations, stored in a single set of weights, for both exemplar-like representations of
individuals, and prototype-like representations of categories. Recently, Rogers and
McClelland (2004, 2005) have extended this work to explore a broader spectrum of semantic
phenomena.
The original aim of the Rogers and McClelland (2004) framework, as first instantiated by
Rumelhart (1990) and Rumelhart and Todd (1993), was to simulate behavioral phenomena
accounted for by the hierarchical network model. The model consists of two input layers,
the item and relation layers, which correspond to the subject noun (canary) and relation
(can ⁄ isa) in a sentence used for feature or category verification (‘‘A canary can fly’’ or
‘‘A canary is a bird’’). Each item layer unit represents a perceptual experience with an item
in the environment (e.g., a particular canary). The relation layer units encode the four
relations (has, can, is, ISA) used in Collins and Quillian (1969). The output (attribute) layer
represents features of the input items. When the trained model is presented with canary and
has as inputs, it outputs features such as <wings> and <feathers>, simulating feature
verification. Rogers and McClelland also included superordinate (bird) and basic-level
(canary) labels as output features. Thus, when presented with canary and isa as inputs, the
model outputs bird and canary, simulating category verification.
C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009) 667
Rogers and McClelland (2004) demonstrated that their model developed representations
across hidden layer units that resembled superordinate representations. For example, if
canary was presented as input and the model activated the superordinate node (bird), but
not the basic-level node, this indicated that the model’s representation for canary more
closely resembled that of a superordinate than a basic-level concept. This pattern of results
occurred only under circumstances where the model was unable to discriminate among
individual items (e.g., canary and robin), as when the model was ‘‘lesioned’’ by adding
noise to the weights or at points during training. Using this and other versions of the model,
Rogers and McClelland (2004) provided insights into, most notably, patterns of impairment
in dementia (Warrington, 1975) and numerous developmental phenomena (Gelman, 1990;
Macario, 1991; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
1.3. A new approach to distributed representation of superordinate concepts
We implement our theory in a distributed attractor network with feature-based seman-
tic representations derived from participant-generated norms, and we provide both quali-
tative and quantitative tests. Our aim is to demonstrate that in treating concepts of
different specificity identically in terms of the assumptions underlying learning and
representation, one can capture the structure, computation, and temporal dynamics of
basic-level and superordinate concepts. Our model extends those we have used to exam-
ine basic-level phenomena (Cree, McNorgan, & McRae, 2006; McRae, de Sa, &
Seidenberg, 1997), and they borrow heavily from pioneering work in this area (Hinton,
1981, 1986; Masson, 1991; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Plaut & Shallice, 1994;
Rumelhart, 1990).
An important commonality between our model and that of Rogers and McClelland
(2004) is that both depend on the statistical regularities among objects and entities in a
human’s environment (semantic structure) for shaping semantic representations. Observ-
ing the same features across repeated experiences with some entity or class of entities
guides the abstraction of a coherent concept from perceptual experience (Randall, 1976;
Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). Category cohesion, the degree
to which the semantic representations for a class of entities tends to overlap or hold
together, shapes the specificity of a concept; the less cohesive the set of features that
are consistently paired with a concept across instances, the more general the concept is,
on average. Also relevant are feature correlations, the degree to which a pair of
features co-occurs across multiple entities (e.g., something that <has a beak> also tends
to <have wings>). Finally, regularities in labeling concepts at both the basic and super-
ordinate levels play a key role in learning.
The present research extends Rogers and McClelland’s (2004) approach in two important
respects: by using a model that computes explicit feature-based superordinate representa-
tions, and by incorporating temporal dynamics in the model’s computations. Rogers and
McClelland were not primarily concerned with constructing a network that developed repre-
sentations for superordinate concepts per se. In contrast, we simulated the learning of super-
ordinate and basic-level terms in the following manner. On each learning trial, a concept’s
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label (name) was input, and it was paired with semantic features representing an instance of
that concept in the environment. This simulates a central way in which we learn word mean-
ing, through reading or hearing a word while the mental representation of its intended
referent is active. For example, a parent might point to the neighbor’s poodle and say
‘‘dog.’’ This labeling practice can be applied equivalently to basic-level and superordinate
concepts. For example, people apply superordinate labels when referring to groups of enti-
ties (‘‘I ate some fruit for breakfast’’), physically present objects (‘‘Pass me that tool’’), or
to avoid repetition in discourse (‘‘She jumped into her car and backed the vehicle out of the
driveway’’). Thus, each superordinate learning trial consists of a superordinate label paired
with an instance of that class. For example, the model might be presented with the word
‘‘tool’’ in conjunction with the semantic features of hammer on one trial, the features of
wrench on another, and the features of screwdriver on yet another. In contrast, for basic-
level concepts, the model is presented with consistent word-feature pairings. For example,
the word ‘‘hammer’’ is always paired with the features of hammer.
In line with our training regimen, a number of studies of conceptual development support
the idea that the connections established between a label and the corresponding set of
perceptual instances are important in shaping the components of meaning activated when
we read or hear a word (Booth & Waxman, 2003; Fulkerson & Haaf, 2003; Waxman &
Markow, 1995). Plunkett, Hu, and Cohen (2007) presented 10-month-old infants with
artificial stimuli that, based on their category structure, could be organized into a single cate-
gory or into two categories. When the familiarization phase did not include labels, the
infants abstracted two categories. When infants were provided with two labels consistent
with this structure, the results were equivalent to the no-label condition. However, when
infants were given two pseudo-randomly assigned labels, concept formation was disrupted.
Crucially, presenting a single label for all stimuli resulted in the infants forming a single,
one might say superordinate, representation despite the natural tendency for them to create
two categories. These results demonstrate the importance of the interaction between labels
and semantic structure and, in particular, how labeling leads to the formation of concepts at
different ‘‘levels.’’
The second important way in which our modeling differs from Rogers and
McClelland’s (2004) is that our model incorporates processing dynamics. Rogers and
McClelland used a feedforward architecture in which activation propagates in a single
direction (from input to output). Because their model contained no feedback connections,
directly investigating the time course of processing was not possible. Rogers and
McClelland acknowledged the omission of recurrent connections to be a simplification
and assumed that such connections are present in the human semantic system. In
contrast, a primary goal of our research is to demonstrate the ability of a flat connection-
ist network to account for behavior that unfolds over time, such as feature verification
and semantic priming. Therefore, we used an attractor network, a class of connectionist
models in which recurrent connections enable settling into a stable state over time,
allowing us to investigate the time course of the computation of superordinate and basic-
level concepts.
C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009) 669
1.4. Overview
We describe the model in Section 2. In Section 3, we demonstrate that it develops repre-
sentations for superordinate and basic-level concepts that fit with intuition and that capture
superordinate category membership. Section 4 presents quantitative demonstrations of the
relations among these concept types by simulating typicality ratings. In Section 5, the mod-
el’s representations of superordinates are investigated using a speeded feature verification
task. In Section 6, we use the contrast between the model’s superordinate and basic-level
representations, in conjunction with its temporal dynamics, to provide insight into the coun-
terintuitive finding that superordinates equivalently prime high and low typicality basic-
level exemplars. This result is inconsistent with all previous theories of semantic memory
because those frameworks predict that the magnitude of such priming effects should reflect
prime-target similarity. Interestingly and surprisingly, the model accounts for all of these
results using a flat representation, that is, without transparently instantiating a conceptual
hierarchy.
2. The model
We first present the derivation of the features used to train the basic-level and superordi-
nate concepts, followed by the model’s architecture. The manner in which the model com-
putes a semantic representation from word form, and the training regime, is then described.
2.1. Concepts
2.1.1. Basic-level concepts
The semantic representations for the basic-level concepts were taken from McRae, Cree,
Seidenberg, and McNorgan’s (2005) feature production norms (henceforth, ‘‘our norms’’).
Participants were presented with basic-level names, such as dog or chair, and were asked to
list features. Each concept was presented to 30 participants, and any feature that was listed
by five or more participants was retained. The norms consist of 541 concepts that span a
broad range of living and nonliving things. This resulted in a total of 2,526 features of vary-
ing types (Wu & Barsalou, in press), including external and internal surface features (bus
<is yellow>, peach <has a pit>), function (hammer <used for pounding nails>), internal and
external components (car <has an engine>, octopus <has tentacles>), location (salmon
<lives in water>), what a thing is made of (fork <made of metal>), entity behaviors (dog
<barks>), systemic features (ox <is strong>), and taxonomic information (violin <a musical
instrument>).
All taxonomic features were excluded for two reasons, resulting in 2,349 features. First,
features that describe category membership are arguably different from those that describe
parts, functions, and so on. Second, it could be argued that including taxonomic features in
the model would be equivalent to providing hierarchical information, which we wished to
avoid.
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2.1.2. Superordinate concepts
The goal was to have the model learn superordinates via its experience with basic-level
exemplars. Therefore, the superordinate features such as carrot <a vegetable> were used to
establish categories and their exemplars. These features indicated the category (or catego-
ries) to which the norming participants believed each basic-level concept belonged (if any).
Using a procedure similar to that of Cree and McRae (2003), a basic-level concept was con-
sidered a member of a superordinate category if at least two participants listed the superordi-
nate feature for that concept. A superordinate was used if it was listed for more than 10
basic-level concepts. The goal of using this criterion was to include a reasonably large, rep-
resentative sample of exemplars for each superordinate. The sole exception was plant, which
was excluded because only five of the 18 exemplars were not fruits or vegetables, and there-
fore the sample was not representative. These criteria resulted in 20 superordinates, ranging
from 133 exemplars (animal) to 11 (fish). The number of superordinates with which a basic-
level concept was paired ranged from 0 (e.g., ashtray, key) to 4 (e.g., cat is an animal, mam-
mal, pet, and predator). The resulting 611 superordinate–exemplar pairs are presented in
Appendix A.
2.2. Architecture
The network consisted of two layers of units, wordform and semantics, described below
(see Fig. 1). All 30 wordform units were connected unidirectionally to the 2,349 semantic
feature units. The wordform units were not interconnected. All semantic feature units were
fully interconnected (with no self-connections). Although all connections were unidirec-
tional, semantic units were connected in both directions (i.e., two connections) so that
activation could pass bidirectionally between each pair of feature units.
2.2.1. Wordform input layer
Each basic-level and superordinate concept was assigned a three-unit code such that turn-
ing on (activation = 1) the three units denoting a concept name and turning off (activa-
tion = 0) the remaining 27 units can be interpreted as presenting the network with the
spelling or sound of the word. Of the 4,060 possible input patterns, 541 unique three-unit
combinations were assigned randomly to the basic-level concepts, and 20 to the superordi-
nates. Random overlapping wordform patterns were assigned because there is generally no
Semantic
Units
(2349 units)
Word Form
(30 units)
Fig. 1. Model architecture.
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systematic mapping from wordform to semantics in English monomorphemic words, and
many concept names overlap phonologically and orthographically.
2.2.2. Semantic output layer
Each output unit corresponded to a semantic feature from our norms. Thus, concepts
were represented as patterns of activation distributed across semantic units. Because
semantic units were interconnected, the model naturally learned correlations between
feature pairs. Thus, if two features co-occur in a number of concepts (as in <has wings>
and <has feathers>), then if one of them is activated, the other will also tend to be
activated by positive weights between them. Alternatively, if two features tend not to
co-occur (<has feathers> and <made of metal>), then if one is activated, the other will
tend to be deactivated.
The use of features as semantic representations is not intended as a theoretical argument
that the mental representation of object concepts exists literally in terms of lists of verbaliz-
able features. However, when participants perform feature-listing tasks, they make use of
the holistic representation for concepts that they have developed through multisensory
experience with things in the world (Barsalou, 2003). Thus, this empirically based approxi-
mation of semantic representation provides a window into people’s mental representations
that captures the statistical regularities among object concepts. In addition, these featural
representations provide a parsimonious and interpretable medium for computational model-
ing and human experimentation.
2.3. Computation of word meaning
To compute word meaning, a three-unit concept name was activated and remained active
for the duration of the computation. Semantic units were initialized to random values
between .15 and .25. Activation spread from each wordform to each semantic unit, as well
as between each pair of semantic units. Input to a semantic unit was computed as the activa-
tion of a sending unit multiplied by the weight of the connection from that sending unit. The
net input xj (at tick t) to unitj was then computed according to Eq. 1:
x
½t
j ¼ s
X
i
s
½ts
i wji þ bj
 !
þ ð1 sÞx½tsj ð1Þ
where si is the activation of uniti sending activation to unitj, and wji is the weight of the
connection between uniti and unitj. s (tau) is a constant between 0 and 1 used to denote the
duration of each time tick (.2 in our simulations). As such, x
½ts
j denotes net input to unitj at
the previous time tick. Each of these time ticks is a subdivision of a time step, and it consists
of passing activation forward one step. Time ticks are used to discretize and simulate
continuous processing between time steps (Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson,
1996). The net input to unitj at time t is converted to an activation value (aj
[t]) according to
the sigmoidal activation function presented in Eq. 2, where xj
[t] is the net input to unitj from
Eq. 1 (at time t).
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a
½t
j ¼
1
1þ eðx½tj Þ
ð2Þ
Activation propagated for four time steps, each of which was divided into five ticks, for a
total of 20 time ticks. After the network had been fully trained, it settled on a semantic rep-
resentation for a word in the form of a set of activated features at the semantic output layer.
2.4. Training
Prior to training, weights were set to random values between ).05 and .05. For each train-
ing trial, the model was presented with a concept’s wordform and activation accrued over
four time steps (ticks 1–20). For the last two time steps (ticks 11–20), the target semantic
representation was provided, and error was computed. This allows a concept’s activation to
accumulate gradually because the training regime does not constrain the network to com-
pute the correct representation until tick 11. The cross-entropy error (CEE) metric was used
because it is more suitable than are the more frequently used squared-error metrics for two
reasons. First, during training, features can be considered as being either present (on) or
absent (off), and intermediate states are understood as the probability that each feature is
present. Thus, the output on the semantic layer represents a probability distribution that
is used in computing cross entropy (Plunkett & Elman, 1997). Second, this error metric is
advantageous for a sparse network such as this one—where only five to 21 of the 2,329 fea-
ture units should be on for the basic-level concepts—because it produces large error values
when a unit’s activation is on the wrong side of .5. One potential way for our sparse network
to reduce error is to turn off all units at the semantic layer. Thus, punishing the network for
incorrectly turning units off allows the model to more easily change the states of those units.
CEE (E), averaged over the last two time steps (10 ticks) was computed as in Eq. 3:
E ¼ s
P19
t¼10
P2348
j¼0 dj lnðajÞ þ ð1 djÞ lnð1 ajÞ
10
ð3Þ
where dj is the desired target activation for unitj, and aj is the unit’s observed activation.
After each training epoch, in which every concept was presented, weight changes were
calculated using the continuous recurrent backpropagation-through-time algorithm (Pearl-
mutter, 1995). The learning rate was .01 and momentum (.9) was added after the first 10
training epochs (Plaut et al., 1996). Training and simulations were performed using Mikenet
version 8.02.
2.4.1. Basic-level concepts
The basic-level concepts were trained using a one-to-one mapping. That is, for each
basic-level training trial, the network learned to map its wordform to the same set of seman-
tic features. Error correction was scaled by familiarity. This was based on familiarity ratings
in which participants were asked how familiar they were with ‘‘the thing to which the word
refers’’ on a 9-point scale, where 9 corresponded to ‘‘extremely familiar’’ and 1 to ‘‘not
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familiar at all’’ (McRae et al., 2005). The scaling parameter was applied to the error com-
puted at each unit in the semantic layer, and it was calculated using Eq. 4:
Sb ¼ :9 famb
maxðfamÞ ð4Þ
where Sb is the scaling parameter applied to a basic-level concept, famb is the familiarity of
that concept, and max(fam) is the maximum familiarity rating across all basic-level con-
cepts. Thus, familiar concepts exerted a greater influence on the weight changes than did
unfamiliar concepts, simulating people’s differential experience with various objects and
entities. The reason for including .9 is described in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.2. Superordinate concepts
Superordinate training was somewhat more complex. The operational assumption was
that people learn the meaning associated with a superordinate label by experiencing that
label paired with specific exemplars (note that if a superordinate label is used to refer to
groups of objects, this manner of training also applies). Thus, superordinate concepts were
trained using a one-to-many mapping. Rather than consistently mapping from a given word-
form to a single set of features (as was done with basic-level concepts), the model was
trained to map from a superordinate wordform to various exemplar featural representations
on different trials. For example, when presented with the wordform for vegetable, on some
learning trials it was paired with the features of asparagus, and on others those of broccoli,
carrot, and so on. Over an epoch of training, the model was presented with the featural rep-
resentations of all 31 vegetable exemplars, each paired with the wordform for vegetable.
This process was performed for all 20 categories and all exemplars in each category.
We assume that, in reality, the process by which both types of concepts are learned is
identical. Although basic-level concepts were trained in a one-to-one fashion, people experi-
ence individual apples, bicycles, and dogs, and these instances often are paired with basic-
level labels (generated either externally or internally). If the model had learned basic-level
concepts through exposure to individual instances, such as individual apples, we assume that
it would develop representations similar to the ones with which it was presented in the train-
ing herein. This would occur because instances of basic-level concepts tend to overlap sub-
stantially in terms of features. For example, almost every onion <is round>, <tastes strong>,
<has skin>, and so on. Therefore, if the model was presented with individual onions, these
features would emerge from training with activations close to 1, due to the high degree of
featural overlap (cohesion) among instances. The one-to-one mapping assumption was
made, therefore, to simplify training.
The assumption also applies to training superordinates. The way that basic-level and
superordinate concepts are learned is qualitatively identical. That is, in reality, superordinate
concepts are also learned through exposure to instances. As such, if the model was presented
with individual instances of onions, carrots, and beets along with the wordform for
vegetable, it would presumably develop representations similar to those it learned using the
present training regime, in which it was trained on basic-level representations.
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2.4.3. Scaling issues
Three scaling issues concerning superordinate learning were considered. First, it was
necessary to decide how often the network should associate each exemplar with its
superordinate label. There are multiple possibilities. For example, exemplars that are
more familiar could be paired with the superordinate label more frequently under the
assumption that familiar exemplars exert a stronger influence in learning a superordinate
than do unfamiliar exemplars. Conversely, it could be argued that exemplars that are
less familiar are more likely to be referenced with their superordinate label because
people have greater difficulty retrieving the concepts’ basic-level names and use the
superordinate name instead. Although both of these possibilities (and others) are reason-
able, there is no research to suggest that any option is more valid than another. There-
fore, we used the training regime that relied on the fewest assumptions; we presented
each exemplar equiprobably. For example, if a category had 20 exemplars, each was
associated with the superordinate label 5% of the time.
A crucial point here is that pairing a superordinate label equally frequently with the
semantic representation of each of its exemplars means that typicality was not trained into
the model. This is critical because behavioral demonstrations of graded structure are a major
hallmark of category-exemplar relations, and capturing the influence of typicality is an
important component of the experiments and simulations presented herein.
The second issue concerns how often to train superordinates in relation to each other.
Because of the general nature of superordinate concepts, it seemed inappropriate to use
subjective familiarity as an estimate. That is, it is unclear what it means to ask someone
how familiar they are with the things to which furniture refers. The most reasonable solu-
tion was to use word frequency under the assumption that the amount that people learn
about superordinate concepts varies with the frequency with which its label is applied.
Therefore, superordinate concepts were frequency weighted in a fashion similar to the
weighting of the basic-level concepts by familiarity. Superordinate name frequency was
measured as the natural logarithm of the concept’s frequency taken from the British
National Corpus, ln(BNC). The scaling parameter applied to the error measure was
ln(BNC) of a superordinate name (summed over singular and plural usage), divided by the
sum over all 20 superordinates.
The final issue concerns how to scale superordinate relative to basic-level training.
Wisniewski and Murphy (1989) counted instances of basic-level and superordinate names in
the Brown Corpus (Francis & Kucera, 1982). They found that 10.6% (298 ⁄2,807) were
superordinate names and 89.4% (2509 ⁄2,807) were basic level. In mother–child discourse,
Lucariello and Nelson (1986) found that mothers used superordinate labels 11.4% of the
time (142 ⁄1,244) and basic-level labels 88.6% of the time (1,102 ⁄1,244). Therefore, we
trained superordinates 10% of the time, and basic level concepts 90%. This was simulated
by scaling the error at each semantic unit, which is why .9 appears in Eq. 4, and .1 in Eq. 5.
Thus, basic-level concepts had a greater influence than superordinate concepts on the
changes in the weighted connections during training.1
To summarize, the scaling parameter (Ss) applied to the error computed at each semantic
unit was calculated for each superordinate label-exemplar features pair using Eq. 5:
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Ss ¼ :1 lnðBNCsÞ
ns 
P20
k¼1 lnðBNCkÞ
ð5Þ
where BNCs is the frequency of the superordinate name from the British National Corpus,
and ns is the number of exemplars in the superordinate’s category. The scaling parameter
included ns so that all pairings of a single superordinate label with its exemplars’ semantic
representations summed to the equivalent of a single presentation of the superordinate
concept.
2.4.4. Completion of training
Because the model was allowed to develop its own superordinate representations, they
could not be used to determine when to terminate training. Ordinarily, training is stopped
when a model has learned the patterns to some prespecified criterion. In this case, the ‘‘cor-
rect’’ featural representation for the superordinates was unknown because they were trained
in a one-to-many fashion. However, the target features for the basic-level concepts were
known. Therefore, training stopped when the model had successfully learned them; that is,
when 95% of the features that were intended to be on (activation = 1) had an activation
level of .8 or greater (across all 541 concepts). This was achieved after 150 training epochs.
By training the network until a single point in time where all superordinate and basic-
level concepts had attained a static and stable semantic representation, we are not arguing
that humans possess a static representation for either type of concept. On the contrary, we
believe that concepts constantly develop and vary dynamically over time such that they are
sensitive to context and aggregated experience (Barsalou, 2003). For these reasons, as well
as the fact that knowledge is stored in the weights in networks such as these, we use the term
‘‘computing meaning,’’ rather than, for example, ‘‘accessing meaning,’’ throughout this
article.
3. Superordinate representations and category membership
3.1. Superordinate representations
To verify that the model developed reasonable representations for the superordinate con-
cepts, the network was presented with the three-unit wordform for each superordinate and
was allowed to settle on a semantic representation over 20 time ticks. As one example, the
features of vegetable with activation levels greater than .2 after 20 time ticks are presented
in Table 1. Interestingly, although one feature is activated close to 1 (<is edible>), most are
only partially activated. For example, <grows in gardens> and <eaten in salads> have acti-
vation levels of .56 and .39, respectively. This pattern of midlevel activations is characteris-
tic of all of the computed superordinate representations. Contrast this with the activation
pattern for celery, also presented in Table 1. The semantic units of all basic-level concepts
had activation levels close to 1 or 0. For example, of all celery features with activations
greater than .2, the lowest were <has stalks> and <tastes good> at .89. This difference in
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activation patterns results from three factors underlying the semantic structure of conceptual
representations: feature frequency, category cohesion, and feature correlations, all of which
influence learning.
3.1.1. Feature frequency
As would be expected, the activation levels of superordinate features depend on the num-
ber of exemplars possessing each feature. When the model (and presumably a human as
well) is presented with the label for a superordinate, such as vegetable, it is not always paired
with the same set of features. Therefore, features that appear in many (or all) members of the
category, such as <is edible>, are highly activated. Those that appear in some members like
<grows in gardens> have medium levels of activation, and those appearing in a few con-
cepts, like <is orange>, have low activation. Thus, not all superordinate concepts have only a
few features with high activations. For example, bird has a number of features with activa-
tions greater than .85, such as <has a beak>, <has feathers>, <has wings>, and <flies>. This
is consistent with the suggestion that bird may actually be a basic-level concept.
Table 1
Computed network representations for vegetable and celery
Concept Feature Activation
Vegetable <is edible> .79
<grows in gardens> .56
<is green> .56
<eaten by cooking> .48
<is round> .48
<eaten in salads> .39
<is nutritious> .38
<is small> .34
<is white> .33
<tastes good> .33
<has leaves> .31
<is crunchy> .28
<grows in the ground> .24
Celery <is green> .98
<grows in gardens> .97
<is crunchy> .96
<is nutritious> .94
<has leaves> .93
<eaten in salads> .92
<is edible> .91
<is long> .91
<is stringy> .91
<tastes bland> .91
<eaten with dips> .90
<has fiber> .90
<has stalks> .89
<tastes good> .89
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3.1.2. Category cohesion
Many other concepts, like fish or tree, can also be argued to function as basic-level as
well as superordinate concepts (Rosch et al., 1976). The exemplars of these categories share
many features (e.g., basically all birds include <has feathers>, <has a beak>, and <has
wings>) and differ in few features, such as their color. The patterns of features for these con-
cepts are consequently highly cohesive, producing strongly activated features for bird. In
contrast, other superordinates such as furniture have few features that are shared by many
exemplars (e.g., <made of wood>). Thus, the exemplars of these categories are not cohesive
in terms of overlapping features because they differ in many respects (e.g., color, external
components, function). Thus, category cohesion has direct implications for the conceptual
representations that the models learn to compute. For example, furniture included few
strongly activated features.
3.1.3. Feature correlations
For the present purposes, features were considered correlated if they tend to co-occur in
the same basic-level concepts (McRae et al., 1997). For example, various birds include both
<has wings> and <has feathers>. Attractor networks naturally learn these correlations, and
they play an important role in computing word meaning. People also learn these distribu-
tional statistics implicitly by interacting with the environment, and these statistics influence
conceptual computations (McRae, Cree, Westmacott, & de Sa, 1999). In the present model,
features that are mutually correlated activate one another during the computation of superor-
dinate concepts (and basic-level concepts as well). Therefore, feature correlations, particu-
larly across exemplars of a superordinate category, strongly influence what features are
activated for a superordinate.
3.2. Delineating members from nonmembers
We begin with a simulation that addresses whether the network can delineate between
category members versus nonmembers. We computed the representations for all superordi-
nate and basic-level concepts by inputting the wordform for each and then letting the net-
work settle. We calculated the cosine between the network’s semantic representations for
every superordinate-basic level pair, thus providing a measure of similarity, as in Eq. 6.
cos ~x;~yð Þ ¼
P2349
i¼1 xiyiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiP2349
i¼1 x
2
i
q ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiP2349
i¼1 y
2
i
q ð6Þ
In Eq. 6, ~x is the vector of feature activations for a superordinate, ~y is the vector for an
exemplar, and xi and yi are the feature unit activations.
We sorted the basic-level concepts in terms of descending similarity to each superordi-
nate. For testing the model, an exemplar was considered a category member if at least 2 of
30 participants in our norms provided the superordinate category as a feature for the basic-
level concept (the same criterion used to generate the superordinate-basic level pairs).
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Our measure of the extent to which the model can delineate categories was the number of
basic-level concepts that were ranked in the top n in terms of similarity to each superordi-
nate, where n is the number of category members (according to the 2 of 30 norming partici-
pants criterion). For example, there are 39 clothing exemplars, so we counted the number of
them that fell within the 39 exemplars that were most similar to clothing. This provides a
reasonably conservative measure of the network’s performance because the criterion is a lib-
eral estimate of category membership (i.e., it includes those exemplars residing at the fuzzy
boundaries, McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978).
In general, the network captures category membership extremely well (see Table 2).
Clothing and bird were perfect in that all category members had higher cosines than did any
nonmembers. There was only a single omission for five superordinates, and the network’s
errors were quite reasonable: furniture (lamp), fish (shrimp preceded guppy), container (dish
preceded freezer), vehicle (canoe was 29th, whereas wheelbarrow intruded at 23rd; there
were 27 vehicles), and musical instrument (bagpipe was one slot lower than it should have
been). There were two omissions for appliance (radio and telephone came after corkscrew
and colander), and insect (caterpillar and flea came after two birds, oriole and starling).
Four superordinates contained three omissions: animal (missed crab, python, and surpris-
ingly, bull, while intruding grasshopper, housefly, and sardine, which are all technically
animals); carnivore (dog, alligator, and porcupine lay outside the cutoff); herbivore (missed
turtle, giraffe, and grasshopper, although two of three false alarms are actually herbivores,
Table 2
The network’s prediction of category membership
Category
Number of
Exemplars
Number Within
Criterion
Percent
Correct
Furniture 15 14 93
Appliance 14 12 86
Weapon 39 33 85
Utensil 22 19 86
Container 14 13 93
Clothing 39 39 100
Musical instrument 18 17 94
Tool 34 25 74
Vehicle 27 26 96
Fruit 29 27 93
Bird 39 39 100
Insect 13 11 85
Vegetable 31 27 87
Fish 11 10 91
Animal 133 130 98
Pet 22 17 77
Mammal 57 51 89
Carnivore 19 16 84
Herbivore 18 15 83
Predator 17 14 82
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donkey, and chipmunk, but not mink); and predator (tiger, hyena, and alligator fell below
crocodile, buzzard, and hare, although why participants listed predator for alligator but not
for crocodile is a bit of a mystery).
Other categories included mammal, for which there were five errors, only one of which
is clearly a mammal (mole), and pet, for which category membership was captured for
only 17 of 22 exemplars. There was a bit of fruit ⁄vegetable confusion, although this is
common with people as well. For fruit, pickle and peas preceded pumpkin and rhubarb,
and for vegetable, garlic, corn, pumpkin, and pepper were preceded by some exemplars
that are clearly fruits, pear, strawberry, and blueberry. Finally, there were also some tool ⁄
weapon confusions. There were six items that were erroneously included as weapons,
although half of them could be used as such (scissors, spade, and rake; see one of numer-
ous movies for examples). The omitted exemplars were catapult, whip, stick, stone, rock,
and belt, all of which are atypical weapons. There were likewise weapon ⁄ tool confusions
at the boundary of tool.
In summary, the network’s representations clearly capture category membership. The
errors primarily reflect our liberal criterion for category membership, occurring at the fuzzy
boundaries, and are reasonable in the vast majority of cases. In Experiment 1 and Simulation
1, we investigate whether the network can account for a related, but somewhat more fine-
grained measure, graded structure within those categories.
4. Experiment 1 and Simulation 1: Typicality ratings
Categories exhibit graded structure in that some exemplars are considered to be better
members than others (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith et al.,
1974). Typicality ratings have been used extensively as an empirical measure of this struc-
ture. Thus, it is important that our model accounts for them. Participants provided typicality
ratings for the superordinate and basic-level concepts on which the network was trained.
This task was simulated, and the model’s ability to predict the behavioral data was tested.
Family resemblance was used as a baseline for assessing the model’s performance. Family
resemblance is known to be an excellent predictor of behavioral typicality ratings (Rosch &
Mervis, 1975). Lastly, interesting insights are gained by considering the successes and short-
falls of the model.
4.1. Experiment 1
4.1.1. Method
4.1.1.1. Participants: Forty-two undergraduate students at the University of Western
Ontario participated for course credit, 21 per list. In all studies reported herein, participants
were native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
4.1.1.2. Materials: Experiment 1 was conducted prior to the current project and included
other superordinate categories. Typicality ratings were collected for all categories used by
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Cree and McRae (2003). Thus, there were 33 superordinate categories and 729 nonunique
exemplars (many exemplars appeared in multiple categories). Because 729 rating trials were
deemed to be too many for a participant to complete, there were two lists. The first list con-
sisted of 17 categories and 373 basic-level concepts, and the second consisted of 16 catego-
ries and 356 basic-level concepts. Both lists contained concepts from the living and
nonliving domains.
4.1.1.3. Procedure: Instructions were presented on a Macintosh computer using Psy-
Scope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) and were read aloud to the par-
ticipant. Participants were told they would see a category name as well as an instance
of that category, and they were asked to rate how ‘‘good’’ an example each instance
is of the category, using a 9-point scale which was presented on the screen for each
trial. They were instructed that ‘‘9 means you feel the member is a very good exam-
ple of your idea of what the category is,’’ and ‘‘1 means you feel the member fits
very poorly with your idea or image of the category (or is not a member at all).’’
Participants were provided with an example and performed 20 practice trials using the
category sport, with verbal feedback if requested. Categories were presented in blocks,
with randomly ordered presentation of exemplars within a category. The typicality rat-
ing for each superordinate–exemplar pair was the mean across 21 participants. No
time limit was imposed, and participants were instructed to work at a comfortable
pace.
4.2. Simulation 1
4.2.1. Method
4.2.1.1. Materials: The items were the 611 superordinate–exemplar pairs on which the
model was trained.
4.2.1.2. Procedure: To simulate typicality rating, we first initialized the semantic units to
random values between .15 and .25 (as in training). The basic-level concept’s wordform
(e.g., celery) was then activated and the network was allowed to settle for 20 ticks.
The computed representation was then recorded, as if it was being held in working memory.
The semantic units were reinitialized, the superordinate’s wordform (e.g., vegetable) was
presented, and the network was allowed to settle for 20 ticks. To simulate typicality ratings,
we calculated the cosine between the network’s computed semantic representations for
each superordinate-basic-level pair as in Eq. 6. To test the model’s ability to account for
typicality ratings, the cosine between each superordinate–exemplar pair was correlated with
participants’ mean typicality ratings.
Family resemblance was calculated using the feature production norms and computed as
in Rosch and Mervis (1975). For all exemplars of a superordinate, each feature from the
norms received a score corresponding to the number of concepts in the category that possess
that feature. The family resemblance of an exemplar within a category was the sum of the
scores for all of the exemplar’s features.
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4.3. Results and discussion
Because positive correlations were predicted, and there was no reason to expect negative
correlations, all reported p-values are based on a one-tailed distribution. As presented in
Table 3, the Pearson product-moment correlation between the model’s cosine similarity and
the typicality ratings was significant for 13 of 20 categories, showing that the model was
successful in simulating graded structure.2 By comparison, family resemblance predicted
typicality ratings for those same 13 categories. Thus, the predictive abilities of the model
and family resemblance were comparable. Furthermore, all correlations between model
cosine and family resemblance were significant except one (container, p = .052), and they
ranged from .45 to .93. These correlations reflect the fact that the number of exemplars that
possess a feature is a major contributor to the superordinates’ representations in the model.
That the correlations are not consistently extremely high reflects the fact that feature correla-
tions influence learning and computations in the network, but not in the family resemblance
measure. There were, however, a few categories that proved difficult for the model and fam-
ily resemblance in terms of simulating graded structure.
Table 3
Correlations among superordinate ⁄ basic-level cosine from the model (Simulation 1),
family resemblance scores, and typicality ratings (Experiment 1)
Category N
Cosine
and
Typicality
Family
Resemblance
and Typicality
Cosine and
Family
Resemblance
Furniture 15 .76** .62** .74**
Appliance 14 .69** .73** .92**
Weapon 39 .63** .70** .83**
Utensil 22 .50** .52** .73**
Container 14 .49* .50* .45
Clothing 39 .46** .50** .81**
Musical instrument 18 .44* .54* .93**
Tool 34 .38* .38* .69**
Vehicle 27 ).02 .18 .77**
Fruit 29 .73** .69** .90**
Bird 39 .62** .49** .70**
Insect 13 .55* .69** .77**
Vegetable 31 .47** .51** .89**
Fish 11 .38 .36 .91**
Animal 133 .12 .12 .52**
Pet 22 .08 .02 .92**
Mammal 57 .02 .20 .73**
Carnivore 19 .61** .45* .77**
Herbivore 18 ).14 .06 .57**
Predator 17 ).05 .21 .77**
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.
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4.3.1. Low variability
Fish was problematic because of little variability in the human typicality ratings of the
fish exemplars (SD = .86) compared to other categories, such as tool (SD = 1.59) or vegeta-
ble (SD = 1.67). In addition, the typicality and cosine ratings of the fish were high
(M = 7.58 and .71, respectively) compared, for example, to tool (M = 6.18 and .43) or
vegetable (M = 6.57 and .49). The reason for this appears to be that people seem to know
little that distinguishes individual types of fish. Therefore, given that people know only
general features of cod, mackerel, perch, and so on, such as <has gills>, <has scales>, and
<swims>, they rate all of these exemplars as typical because these features are shared by all
fish. Given the limited variability, combined with the fact that this category includes only
11 exemplars in our norms, it is not surprising that it proved difficult for the model and for
family resemblance in terms of predicting graded structure.
4.3.2. Liberal sampling
The vehicle category was also an issue for family resemblance and the model. This was
surprising given that there were 27 exemplars, a reasonable number for the model to use in
developing superordinate representations. However, many of the exemplars in this category
are what might be considered atypical. Of the 27 vehicles, 17 were listed as a vehicle by
fewer than five of the 30 participants in the feature production norms. The remaining 10
exemplars—ambulance, bus, car, dunebuggy, jeep, motorcycle, scooter, tricycle, truck, and
van—are composed of road-worthy vehicles, suggesting that perhaps the true vehicle
representation might be more similar to them.
To test this hypothesis, the semantic representation for car was treated as the superordi-
nate representation for vehicle, and the typicality rating task was resimulated. The
correlation between the new cosine measures in the model and the original typicality ratings
for vehicle using 26 exemplars (i.e., excluding car itself) was .38, p < .05. This improve-
ment in correlation (from ).02) indicates that the original vehicle representation is not
entirely representative. It seems reasonable to assume that during learning in the real world,
people simply do not refer to sailboats, canoes, and skateboards using vehicle, and therefore
including these items equiprobably in the training phase was not particularly realistic.
4.3.3. Mammal and animal
These have been regarded as special cases. People often use animal as the superordinate of
individual mammals more frequently than they use mammal (Rips et al., 1973). People also
correctly verify statements such as ‘‘A cow is an animal’’ faster than ‘‘A cow is a mammal,’’
despite the fact that mammal would seem to be the more directly relevant superordinate. This
unfamiliarity with mammal resulted in participants seemingly relying primarily on size for
rating typicality, whereby large mammals were rated as more typical (e.g., whale, M = 7.5)
and small mammals as less typical (e.g., mouse, M = 6.05). In contrast, the model’s perfor-
mance depended on overlapping features (such as <has 4 legs>, and <has fur>) in simulating
typicality ratings (whale has a cosine of .40, whereas mouse has a cosine of .52).
Animal is unusual because it has been argued to have a number of senses (Deese, 1965;
Rips et al., 1973). For example, animal can be considered in its scientific sense as being the
C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009) 683
superordinate of bird, mammal, insect, and so on, whereas average people use animal to
refer to the biological category of mammals. In support of this idea, when the model’s repre-
sentation for mammal was used to predict typicality ratings for the 133 animal exemplars,
the correlation increased from .12 to .56, p < .001. The poor performance of the model and
family resemblance is due to the fact that the representation for animal is undoubtedly influ-
enced by the pairing of the animal label with many birds, fish, and insects.
4.3.4. Role-governed categories
The three other categories that were problematic for the model were herbivore, pet, and
predator. The reason for this may be that these categories are not learned based on featural
similarity. They may be better thought of as role-governed categories, categories defined by
their role in a relational structure (Markman & Stilwell, 2001). For example, in the relation
hunt(x, y), x plays the role of the hunter and y plays the role of the hunted. In this case, the
category predator is defined by its role as the first argument, x, in the relation. This therefore
defines the exemplars of predator based on their role in the relation (e.g., alligator, cat, and
falcon hunt y). This category type also applies to pet, as the second argument in the relation
domesticate(x, y). More interesting, however, are carnivore and herbivore. In these cases
categorization is contingent on the second argument in the relation eat(x, y). In the above,
the status of one argument was irrelevant (e.g., it did not matter what was hunted). In this
case, carnivore applies to any x (e.g., crocodile) in the relation eat(x, y) where y is flesh, and
herbivore applies to any x (e.g., deer) where y is plants (although we recognize these are
slight oversimplifications).
Given the apparent inability of the model (or family resemblance) to predict typicality
ratings for these categories, it appears that featural similarity is not generally useful for their
classification. Consider, for example, that birds, fish, insects, and mammals can all be herbi-
vores, pets, or predators. However, that the model was able to predict typicality ratings for
carnivore emphasizes Markman and Stilwell’s (2001) argument that role-governed and fea-
ture-based theories need not be independent. The primary reason that the model was suc-
cessful with carnivore is that being a carnivore entails possessing a number of features that
facilitate hunting and eating meat, like <has claws>, <has teeth>, and <is large>. Therefore,
these features are correlated for carnivore, allowing a coherent representation to be formed.
In summary, the model predicts human typicality ratings, producing results that are
roughly equivalent to family resemblance. In Simulation and Experiment 2, we tested the
model in a somewhat more specific manner by investigating whether the degree to which
specific features are activated by superordinate names can predict human feature verification
latencies.
5. Experiment 2 and Simulation 2: Superordinate feature verification
In the model, features of superordinates are activated gradually as a superordinate is com-
puted. Thus, this is the first model to introduce temporal dynamics into the computation of
superordinate representations. In addition, the model activates a superordinate’s features to
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varying and generally intermediate degrees. These characteristics enabled the generation of
testable predictions for a new task, superordinate feature verification.
Feature verification experiments with basic-level concepts have been used to gain
insight into a number of aspects of concept-feature relations (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsa-
lou, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2004). In some cases, the results have been simulated
using attractor networks (Cree et al., 2006; McRae et al., 1999). In those simulations, we
assumed that a feature’s activation while a concept is being computed is monotonically
related to human feature verification latency. Therefore, simulations were conducted by
activating a concept’s wordform and recording the activation of the relevant feature over
time. Experiment and Simulation 2 investigated whether feature activation during the
model’s computation of superordinate concepts predicts superordinate-feature verification
latencies using the identical method as was used with previous studies of basic-level
concepts.
5.1. Experiment 2
5.1.1. Method
5.1.1.1. Participants: Twenty-six University of Western Ontario undergraduates partici-
pated in course credit. One was excluded because his ⁄her mean decision latency was an
extreme outlier, and two were excluded because their error rates were extreme outliers.
5.1.1.2. Materials: Eighteen of the 20 superordinates were used, 10 living and eight non-
living things. Animal was omitted because of insufficient variability in the activation levels
of the features; no feature was activated greater than .5. Musical instrument was omitted
because its name consists of two words, and therefore the time required to read it might
overlap with the presentation of the feature, which would artificially lengthen decision
latencies.
Fifty-four target trials were constructed by pairing each superordinate with three features
(see Appendix B). Because regression analyses were the focus, to provide a suitable distri-
bution, we used features with high, medium, and low activations for each superordinate. A
variety of feature types (Wu & Barsalou, in press) were used, such as external and internal
surface features and components, functions (nonliving things only), entity behaviors (living
things only), locations, systemic features, and what things are made of (nonliving things
only). The intent was to force participants to consider superordinate concepts generally and
not adopt a strategy of focusing on one feature type.
An additional 54 unrelated superordinate trials were constructed, using the same 18
superordinates. Thus, each superordinate was presented three times with a related feature
and three times with an unrelated feature so that a superordinate did not cue the response.
Related and unrelated features were matched for feature type to prevent participants from
using it as a cue (e.g., there were 12 related and 12 unrelated functional features). In addi-
tion, the features for approximately three quarters of unrelated trials were taken from con-
cepts in the same domain as the superordinate (i.e., living or nonliving; bird <spins webs>),
and one quarter from the opposite domain (bird <produces radiation>). An additional 30
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related and 30 unrelated superordinate feature pairs were included as filler trials. Overall,
50% of the trials corresponded to ‘‘yes’’ responses and 50% to ‘‘no.’’
Practice items consisted of 10 ‘‘yes’’ and 10 ‘‘no’’ trials and were comprised of roughly
the same proportions of each feature type used for the experimental trials. The categories
for the practice trials were amphibian, beverage, cleanser, dinosaur, fashion accessory,
food, jewelry, musical instrument, stationary, and toy.
5.1.1.3. Procedure: Participants were tested individually on a Macintosh computer using
PsyScope (Cohen et al., 1993). Instructions were given verbally and appeared on screen.
Participants responded by pressing one of two buttons on a CMU button box, providing
accuracy to the nearest millisecond. For each trial, an asterisk appeared for 250 ms, fol-
lowed by 250 ms of blank screen. A superordinate name then was presented in the center of
the screen for 400 ms, followed immediately by a feature name one line below. Both
remained on screen until the participant responded. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms and
trials occurred in random order.
Participants were instructed to press the ‘‘yes’’ button (using the index finger of their
dominant hand) if the feature was characteristic of the category, such that many members of
the category can be considered to have the feature (otherwise press the ‘‘no’’ button). The
criterion of ‘‘many’’ was used because it is almost always the case with superordinate con-
cepts that a feature does not apply to every exemplar of the category (Rosch & Mervis,
1975). The task took approximately 20 minutes.
5.1.2. Results
All trials for which an error occurred were removed from decision latency analyses.
Decision latencies longer than three standard deviations above the mean of all experimen-
tal trials were replaced by that cutoff value (1.7% of the data). The mean decision latency
for ‘‘yes’’ trials was 824 ms (SE = 16 ms) and for ‘‘no’’ trials was 901 ms (SE = 17 ms).
The mean error rate for ‘‘yes’’ trials was 11% (SE = 2%) and for ‘‘no’’ trials was 5%
(SE = 1%).
5.2. Simulation 2
The assumption underlying Simulation 2 is that human feature verification latency is
monotonically related to the degree to which a feature is activated during the computation
of a superordinate concept. For example, as the representation for tool is computed, the acti-
vation of <has a handle> should predict verification latency for tool-has a handle.
5.2.1. Method
5.2.1.1. Materials: The items were the related target trials used in Experiment 2.
5.2.1.2. Procedure: A feature verification trial was simulated by initializing all feature
units between .15 and .25, and presenting a superordinate’s wordform for 20 time ticks.
Target feature activation was recorded at each time tick.
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5.2.2. Results
Target feature activation was used to predict behavioral feature verification latencies after
feature length in characters (including spaces), feature length in words, feature length in syl-
lables, and feature frequency (ln[BNC] of all content words in the feature) had been forced
into the regression equation (and thus had been partialed out). These lexical variables were
partialed out because they are known to influence reading times, but they play no role in the
current model. The model significantly predicted target feature verification latency from
ticks 4 to 20, with partial correlations ranging from ).28 to ).43, peaking at ticks 9 to 12
(see Table 4). Significant predictions were not expected at the earliest time ticks because
the semantic units were initialized to random values, and the network was just beginning to
settle.
Somewhat surprisingly, verification latency was not significantly predicted by any of the
feature name reading time variables: number of characters, partial r = ).11, p > .4, number
of words, partial r = .09, p > .5, number of syllables, partial r = .04, p > .7, or frequency,
partial r = .14, p > .3. Therefore, to confirm that partialing out these variables did not cause
spurious results, zero-order correlations were calculated. Correlations were significant for
time ticks 3 to 20, with correlations ranging from ).28 to ).43, peaking at ticks 9 and 10.
A potential concern is that activation in the model at different time ticks is correlated,
and thus the alpha level may be inflated across the 20 regressions. However, the purpose of
Table 4
Predicting feature verification latencies (Experiment 2) using fea-
ture unit activations (Simulation 2)
Time Tick Partial Correlation
1 .27
2 ).23
3 ).27
4 ).28*
5 ).29*
6 ).31*
7 ).35*
8 ).40**
9 ).43**
10 ).43**
11 ).43**
12 ).43**
13 ).42**
14 ).41**
15 ).41**
16 ).40**
17 ).40**
18 ).40**
19 ).40**
20 ).40**
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01.
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performing a regression analysis at each tick is to show that the model’s ability to predict
human performance is not limited to a small window of its temporal dynamics. In fact, pre-
dictions were successful for 17 or 18 of 20 ticks, demonstrating that they were robust.
5.3. Discussion
The degree to which superordinate labels activate features in the model successfully pre-
dicted feature verification latencies. Experiment 2 and Simulation 2 were identical in meth-
odology to previous feature verification experiments and simulations using basic-level
concepts (McRae et al., 1999). This provides further support for the idea that the representa-
tions of superordinate concepts are not qualitatively different from basic-level concepts. Just
as the learning and representation of these types of concepts are treated the same, so is the
computation of semantic features. We return to this point in the General Discussion.
The results of Experiment 2 may also be accounted for by spreading activation theory
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). In this theory, stronger criterialities should lead to shorter feature
verification latencies. Criterialities are assumed to be directly related to the frequency with
which a concept label is paired with the semantic feature. To test this hypothesis, the con-
cept-feature pairs used in Experiment 2 and Simulation 2 were each given a score denoting
the proportion of exemplars within the category that possess the relevant feature (like a stan-
dardized featural family resemblance measure). These scores predicted verification laten-
cies, partial r = ).43, p < .01 (with the lexical variables partialed out), suggesting that the
criterialities of spreading activation networks would predict verification latencies for super-
ordinate concepts.
Up to this point, our experiments have examined the offline computation of the similarity
among exemplar and superordinate concepts (via typicality ratings), and the activation lev-
els of superordinate features. One criticism of Simulations 1 and 2 might be that the attractor
network has made predictions that would also be made by family resemblance or spreading
activation theory. However, one advantage of our model is that it embodies temporal
dynamics. Therefore, Experiment 3 and Simulation 3 demonstrate one interesting way in
which in these dynamics are necessary for understanding behavioral phenomena.
6. Experiment 3 and Simulation 3: Superordinate semantic priming
Semantic priming often has been used to gain insight into the structure of semantic mem-
ory. In a standard short stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) semantic priming task, a prime
word is presented for a short period of time such as 250 ms, then a target word is presented
and the participant responds to it (e.g., by indicating whether it refers to a concrete object,
or whether it is indeed a word). If a target word such as hawk is preceded by a prime such as
eagle that is highly similar in terms of featural overlap, decision latency is shorter relative
to an unrelated prime, such as jeep (Frenck-Mestre & Bueno, 1999; McRae & Boisvert,
1998).
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Semantic priming is therefore useful for investigating superordinate–exemplar relations,
as in vegetable priming carrot or pumpkin, compared to an unrelated superordinate prime
such as vehicle. One interesting aspect of priming is that facilitation is sensitive to the rela-
tion between concepts, but participants are not asked to explicitly judge those relations.
Previous research demonstrates that a superordinate prime facilitates the processing of an
exemplar target (Neely, 1991). This result is predicted by all current theories of semantic
memory.
An interesting extension is to test whether the magnitude of priming increases with exem-
plar typicality. In spreading activation theory, vegetable should prime a highly typical
exemplar such as carrot to a greater degree than it primes a less typical exemplar such as
pumpkin. This prediction obtains because the accessibility of an exemplar given a superordi-
nate prime is determined by the criteriality of the superordinate–exemplar connection
weight, and connections to shared features (Collins & Loftus, 1975). A high typicality
exemplar has a strong direct link to its superordinate in addition to multiple shared feature
nodes. A low typicality exemplar has a weaker direct link to its superordinate, in addition to
fewer links to shared features. Therefore, spreading activation theory predicts that the mag-
nitude of priming (relative to an unrelated superordinate prime) increases with typicality.
Distributed feature-based models appear, on the surface, to make the same prediction. An
exemplar is processed more quickly if it shares many features with the superordinate than if
it shares few features because those features are preactivated. As demonstrated in Experi-
ment and Simulation 1, the degree of featural similarity in the present model predicts typi-
cality ratings. Therefore, it appears that our model would predict that the magnitude of
superordinate–exemplar priming increases with typicality. However, as becomes clear
below, the behavior of dynamical systems over time, such as in recurrent neural networks,
is not always entirely obvious.
Although superordinate priming has been studied in a number of experiments, most have
been concerned with expectancy generation (i.e., the ability to anticipate upcoming stimuli)
at long SOAs (Keefe & Neely, 1990; Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989). However, in one study,
Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986) manipulated typicality and used a short 300 ms SOA. They
found priming effects for low, medium, and high typicality exemplars, but surprisingly, no
interaction between typicality and relatedness. Priming was greatest for medium (73 ms),
followed by high (52 ms) and low typicality (30 ms). Note that ‘‘relatedness’’ is used to
refer to related versus unrelated control primes, as is customary in priming studies. Thus,
for example, a superordinate name would be a related prime for its high, medium, and low
typicality exemplars (all three are related to the superordinate because they belong to that
category). The unrelated control prime would be the name of another superordinate cate-
gory, such as vehicle for carrot.
Schwanenflugel and Rey’s (1986) results are surprising. First, they appear to directly con-
tradict all current theories of semantic memory. Second, they conflict with results from anal-
ogous basic-level priming experiments. A number of studies found null effects of short
SOA priming using prime–target pairs that were thought to be semantically similar (Lupker,
1984; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995; Shelton & Martin, 1992; but see
also Frenck-Mestre & Bueno, 1999). However, using significantly more similar pairs
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(as determined by similarity ratings), McRae and Boisvert (1998) showed that a basic-level
concept was primed to a much greater degree by another basic-level concept that was highly
similar than by one that was less similar. That is, eagle primes hawk to a much greater
degree than does robin. In fact, at a short 250 ms SOA, both semantic and lexical decisions
to a target were facilitated only if the prime was highly similar. At a long 750 ms SOA,
priming was significant for both highly and less similar prime-target pairs, but was almost
twice as large for the high similarity items (and thus similarity interacted with relatedness).
These results appear to be inconsistent with those of Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986) in
which superordinate–exemplar priming was not systematically influenced by prime-target
similarity (as indexed by typicality).
McRae and Boisvert (1998) priming effects were simulated using a feature-based connec-
tionist attractor network similar to the present model. Cree, McRae, and McNorgan (1999)
simulated semantic priming by assuming that with a short SOA, a prime is partially acti-
vated prior to the presentation of the target word. Thus, the prime was presented to the net-
work for 15 time ticks (it was trained using 20 ticks), and then the target was presented for
an additional 20 ticks. Cree et al. found larger priming effects for highly than for less similar
prime-target pairs, consistent with McRae and Boisvert’s experiments. This further supports
the notion that the magnitude of priming increases as similarity between prime and target
increases, and again, is contrary to Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986).
In summary, previous theoretical and empirical accounts suggest that Schwanenflugel
and Rey’s (1986) results are implausible. Therefore, Experiment 3 was a replication of their
experiment with two differences. First, a new and larger set of items were derived from our
norms. Second, a two (related vs. unrelated) by two (high vs. low typicality) design was
adopted by removing Schwanenflugel and Rey’s medium typicality condition. Because rep-
licating their results entails a null relatedness by typicality interaction, the two by two
design promoted finding an interaction if there was one to be found. Experiment 3 was then
simulated using the same technique as Cree et al. (1999). To foreshadow the results, Schwa-
nenflugel and Rey’s effect was replicated in both Experiment 3 and Simulation 3.
6.1. Experiment 3
6.1.1. Method
6.1.1.1. Participants: Fifty-three undergraduates at the University of Western Ontario par-
ticipated in course credit, 25 in List 1, and 28 in List 2. One participant from List 2 was
dropped because his ⁄her error rate was an extreme outlier, and two were participants from
List 2 were dropped because their decision latencies were extreme outliers.
6.1.1.2. Materials: Fourteen superordinate categories served as primes—appliance, bird,
carnivore, clothing, container, fruit, furniture, insect, mammal, tool, utensil, vegetable,
vehicle, weapon—and two exemplars from each category served as targets, one low in
typicality and one high (see Appendix C). The distributions of typicality ratings were non-
overlapping: low typicality (M = 5.86, SE = .22), high typicality (M = 8.06, SE = .16),
t(26) = 8.13, p < .001. The groups also differed in mean superordinate–exemplar cosine
690 C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009)
from the model; with the exception of one item, these distributions were nonoverlapping,
low typicality (M = .46, SE = .01), high typicality (M = .57, SE = .01), t(26) = 6.52,
p < .001.
Two lists were constructed so that no participant was presented with a target more than
once or a prime more than twice. For each list, half of the targets were related (a member of
the superordinate category), and half were unrelated. Each half was split equally between
high and low typicality targets. The unrelated primes were created by re-pairing related
primes and targets.
The superordinate primes were the same for both typicality groups. Because the targets
differed, they were equated on a number of variables known to influence word reading, and
thus the potential for priming effects. These are presented in Table 5. The two typicality
groups were equated on word length (number of characters and syllables), printed word fre-
quency (ln(freq) from the BNC), rated concept familiarity, mean number of features per
concept, and Coltheart N (a measure of orthographic neighborhood density). This equating
process, and differentiating the groups on typicality ratings, necessitated reducing the num-
ber of categories from 20 to 14.
To minimize participant expectancies, the same 84 fillers were added to each list. All fil-
ler trials consisted of a superordinate followed by a basic-level concept. As in experimental
trials, all filler primes were presented twice and all targets once. Because a concreteness
decision task was used, 28 fillers were unrelated concrete–abstract pairs (spice–notion,
requiring a ‘‘no’’ response), 28 were unrelated abstract–concrete pairs (religion–razor,
requiring a ‘‘yes’’ response), 14 were unrelated abstract–abstract pairs (emotion–strategy,
‘‘no’’), and 14 were related abstract–abstract pairs (crime–fraud, ‘‘no’’). Thus, half of the
trials required ‘‘yes’’ responses, half of the primes were concrete, and the relatedness pro-
portion was .25. In addition, 25% of the trials were concrete–concrete pairs, 25% were con-
crete–abstract, 25% were abstract–abstract, and 25% were abstract–concrete.
There were 22 practice items, of which six were related (27%), and 11 had targets denot-
ing concrete objects (50%). Six pairs were concrete–abstract (27%), six were concrete–con-
crete (27%), five were abstract–concrete (23%), and five were abstract–abstract (23%).
Thus, proportions were similar to the experimental trials. There were 11 superordinates used
Table 5
Equated variables for high- and low-typicality exemplars in Experiment
3 (semantic priming)
Factor
Typicality
F(1, 26) pHigh Low
Length in characters 6.00 5.93 .02 >.9
Length in syllables 1.79 1.79 .00 1.0
Frequency: ln(BNC) 6.71 6.74 .01 >.9
Familiarity 6.47 6.35 .03 >.8
Number of features ⁄ concept 13.00 13.14 .02 .9
Coltheart N 3.14 3.21 .00 >.9
Note: BNC, British National Corpus.
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as practice primes so that each prime appeared twice and each target once. No experimental
primes or targets appeared in the practice trials.
6.1.1.3. Procedure: Participants performed the experiment individually. The apparatus was
the same as in Experiment 2. A trial consisted of an asterisk for 250 ms, followed by
250 ms of blank screen, the prime for 200 ms, a 50 ms blank screen inter-stimulus interval,
and then the target. The target remained on screen until the participant responded, and
the inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. Participants were instructed to read and pay attention
to the first word, but not to respond to it. They were instructed to press the ‘‘yes’’ button
using the index finger of their dominant hand if the second word referred to a concrete
object, which was defined as ‘‘something that is touchable.’’ The task took approximately
15–20 min.
6.1.1.4. Design: The independent variables were typicality (high vs. low) and relatedness
(related vs. unrelated). List was included as a between-participants dummy variable and
item rotation group as a between-items dummy variable to stabilize variance that may result
from rotating participants and items over lists (Pollatsek & Well, 1995). Relatedness was
within-participants (F1) and within-items (F2), whereas typicality was within-participants
but between-items. The dependent measures were decision latency and the square root of
the number of errors (Myers, 1979).
6.1.2. Results
6.1.2.1. Decision latency: Mean decision latencies for each condition are presented in
Table 6. All trials for which an error occurred were removed from the decision latency anal-
yses. Trials longer than three standard deviations above the mean of the experimental trials
were replaced by that value (2% of the data).
The results replicated Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986). Relatedness did not interact with
typicality, both Fs < 1. In fact, the priming effect for low-typicality pairs (34 ms) was
slightly larger than for high-typicality pairs (27 ms). Decision latencies for related trials
(M = 627 ms, SE = 18 ms) were significantly shorter than for unrelated trials (M = 658 ms,
SE = 18 ms), F1(1, 48) = 12.71, p = .001, F2(1, 24) = 9.52, p < .01. There was no main
effect of typicality, both Fs < 1.
Table 6
Decision latencies (ms) for Experiment 3 (semantic priming)
Typicality
High Low
M SE M SE
Unrelated 654 19 661 19
Related 627 19 627 19
Priming effect 27 34
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6.1.2.2. Error rates: The mean error rates were as follows: related high typicality, 3%
(SE = 1%); unrelated high typicality, 5% (SE = 1%); related low typicality, 5% (SE = 1%);
and unrelated low typicality, 3% (SE = 1%). There was no main effect of relatedness, both
Fs < 1, no main effect of typicality, both Fs < 1, but a marginally significant interaction,
F2(1, 48) = 3.91, p < .1, F2(1, 24) = 3.99, p < .1. However, the error rates were extremely
low, thus exaggerating the influence of a single error from a single participant.
6.2. Simulation 3
Superordinate–exemplar priming was simulated using the prime-target pairs from Experi-
ment 3. The methodology was the same as in Cree et al. (1999) and Masson (1995).
6.2.1. Method
6.2.1.1. Procedure: Prior to presenting the superordinate prime, the activations of all
semantic units were initialized to random values between .15 and .25 (as with training and
Simulations 1 and 2). The superordinate’s wordform was input for 15 ticks. Then, with the
network in the state representing the superordinate, the target’s wordform was input. The
network settled to the representation of the target for the remaining 20 ticks. CEE relative to
the target, with an error radius of .2 (because features with activations >.8 were deemed cor-
rectly on during training), was then computed at the semantic layer over the entire 35 ticks
for each trial. Note that this means that, for the time ticks during which the superordinate
prime was presented (vegetable), we measured error relative to the basic-level target for that
trial (e.g., spinach).
6.2.1.2. Design: Two analyses of variance were conducted. The first was performed on the
first 16 ticks (tick )15 to tick 0 relative to target onset). The second analysis concerned the
final 19 ticks (ticks 1 to 19 relative to target onset) during which the basic-level target was
presented to the model. Although the target was presented at tick 0, its influence is not
observed at the semantic layer until tick 1 when activation spreads from the input to the out-
put layer, and therefore the output of the model at tick 0 is considered with the prime for the
analyses. In both analyses, the independent variables were typicality (low and high),
relatedness (related vs. unrelated), and time tick. Item rotation group was included as a
(between-items) variable to account for changes in variance associated with using different
prime-target pairings across the two lists (Pollatsek & Well, 1995). Relatedness and time
tick were within-items and typicality was between-items. The dependent measure was CEE.
6.2.2. Results
The settling profile for each condition is presented in Fig. 2. While the model processed
the prime, the differences among conditions reflect manipulations of relatedness and typical-
ity. Recall that cross entropy is measured relative to the target (i.e., the difference between
what is being computed from the superordinate prime and the representation of the ensuing
target). As expected, when an unrelated prime such as clothing is computed when the target
is a vegetable, the error trajectory is roughly equivalent whether the target is high (spinach)
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or low typicality (mushroom), because neither resembles clothing. Cross entropy increases
over time in these conditions because the features of the prime that become activated are
inconsistent with the unrelated targets. For the related conditions, as the model settles into a
prime representation (vegetable), CEE relative to a high-typicality target (spinach) is lower
than to a low-typicality target (mushroom), particularly at later ticks (closer to target onset).
After target onset, consistent with the unrelated conditions prior to target onset, the unre-
lated high- and low-typicality items demonstrate similar settling patterns. However, in the
related conditions, the differences in cross entropy between the high- and low-typicality
conditions abate, and the two lines converge after a few ticks.
6.2.2.1. Prime analyses: The anova on the first 16 ticks (tick )15 to tick 0 relative to target
onset), during the presentation of the superordinate, revealed a main effect of time,
F(15, 360) = 1,085,396.00, p < .001, and no main effect of typicality, F < 1. However, over-
all, unrelated primes (M = 61.66, SE = .98) yielded greater error relative to the target exemp-
lars than did related primes (M = 58.10, SE = .91), F(1, 24) = 216.73, p < .001. This
difference is greater for high-typicality than for low-typicality pairs, particularly at later
ticks, resulting in a relatedness by typicality interaction, F(1, 24) = 12.42, p < .01. Related-
ness and typicality further interacted with time because semantic activation was initially ran-
dom, and at early ticks the model had not sufficiently computed its representation, F(15, 360)
= 4.62, p < .001. Therefore, differences among the four conditions were not apparent until
the model had begun to settle into a superordinate representation. For the same reason, time
also interacted with relatedness, F(15, 360) = 101.43, p < .001, and typicality, F(15, 360) =
5.31, p < .001. This pattern of error trajectories was expected given that the cosines between
the primes and targets for the high- and low-typicality conditions were from nonoverlapping
distributions. In addition, the difference between the related high- and low-typicality condi-
tions was expected given that the model predicted offline typicality ratings in Simulation 1.
Fig. 2. Mean cross entropy error relative to the target concept over time in Simulation 3 (semantic priming).
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6.2.2.2. Target analyses: Consistent with Experiment 3 and Schwanenflugel and Rey
(1986), in an anova on ticks 16 to 35 (ticks 1 to 19 relative to target onset), when activation
of the target had reached the semantic layer, typicality and relatedness did not interact,
F < 1. CEE was lower for related (M = 5.73, SE = .47) than for unrelated prime-target pairs
(M = 12.57, SE = .71), F(1, 24) = 134.05, p < .001, showing an overall priming effect.
There was no main effect of typicality, F < 1. A main effect of time obtained in that error
gradually decreased as the model settled into the target basic-level concept, F(18, 432) =
328.31, p < .001. Relatedness and time also interacted because differences in cross entropy
between related and unrelated conditions disappeared over the last few ticks as the concepts
settled fully, F(18, 432) = 93.23, p < .001. Planned comparisons were conducted at each
tick to further investigate the relatedness by time interaction at each level of typicality. For
low-typicality items, there was a significant difference between the related and unrelated
conditions for ticks 2–11 (relative to target onset), and similarly, for the high-typicality
items, differences between related and unrelated conditions were significant for ticks 1–11.
6.3. Discussion
Simulation 3 is consistent with Experiment 3. Targets preceded by a related superordinate
were facilitated for both the model and humans. In both humans and the model, the magni-
tude of priming did not vary systematically with the typicality of the exemplar targets; there
was no hint of an interaction between relatedness and typicality for either the model or
humans, with Experiment 3 and Simulation 3 replicating Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986).
In fact, the magnitude of priming was slightly larger for low-typicality items than for high-
typicality items in Experiment 3.
Note that these results do not mean that the model would be incapable of simulating cate-
gory verification latencies. In category verification, participants are presented with items
such as ‘‘vegetable carrot,’’ and asked to indicate whether a carrot is a member of the vege-
table category. In Simulation 3, we predicted concreteness decision latencies using CEE as
the target settled. If our model was to be used to predict category verification latencies, the
similarity between the superordinate and basic-level exemplar concepts would be key, not
the settling pattern of the exemplar. These similarities are sensitive to typicality, as shown
in Simulation 1 and by the Simulation 3 typicality by relatedness interaction that occurred
prior to target onset. Therefore, the intriguing result is that this difference in baseline simi-
larity did not influence the magnitude of priming.
The results of Experiment 3 and Schwanenflugel and Rey (1986) are problematic for
Collins and Loftus’ (1975) spreading activation theory. In that model, the same static simi-
larity measure is used to account for typicality ratings, superordinate–exemplar priming,
and priming between basic-level concepts.
These results also appear, on the face of it, to contradict predictions of a feature-based
distributed network. However, Simulation 3 produced priming effects of similar magnitude
for both typicality levels, even though Simulation 1 predicted typicality ratings. Also recall
that a model similar in architecture to the present one produced differential priming effects
between basic-level concepts of varying similarity (Cree et al., 1999), and in fact, those
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simulations were successfully replicated using the present model (although we do not pres-
ent the simulations herein). The model’s ability to account for these seemingly inconsistent
results depends on two factors: the nature of superordinate versus basic-level computed rep-
resentations, and the network’s temporal dynamics.
Superordinate concepts are represented quantitatively differently than are basic-level con-
cepts in the model. After settling, most features of superordinate concepts are activated
around .5, whereas features of basic-level concepts are activated close to one. Offline typi-
cality ratings are not influenced by these differences because they are not sensitive to com-
putational temporal dynamics. Typicality ratings were simulated by computing each
representation separately and then comparing them, as humans presumably do. In contrast,
the priming simulation illustrates one consequence of these representational differences.
A feature’s activation in the network is influenced by both the total input to the unit from
all incoming connections, and the sigmoidal activation function (see Fig. 3), which trans-
forms net input into an activation value between zero and one. As a result, features activated
close to .5 are relatively easy to turn on or off. This occurs because the slope of the sigmoi-
dal activation function close to the midpoint is relatively steep. In contrast, it is more diffi-
cult (i.e., requires larger changes in net input) to change the activation of units that have
extremely high or low net input and thus are activated at essentially one or zero. These
exemplar features are illustrated on the extremes of Fig. 3.
When a related superordinate prime (vegetable) is computed, followed by an exemplar
target (spinach), a feature that is shared by the prime and target (e.g., <is green>) contrib-
utes to facilitation because it is preactivated by the prime. If a feature is activated by the
superordinate that is not shared by the exemplar (<is green> for pumpkin), this feature is rel-
atively easy to turn off while pumpkin is being computed because it lies on the steep part of
the activation function. Because at least some features of a superordinate are shared by a
related exemplar, there is indeed a priming effect relative to an unrelated superordinate.
However, because features activated by the superordinate name that are not part of the
exemplar’s representation are relatively easily turned off, there is not a great deal of
Fig. 3. Sigmoidal activation function and activation levels of superordinate and basic-level exemplar features.
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inhibition due to differing features. Thus, the network produces equivalent priming across a
range of typicality.
Contrast this with priming between two basic-level concepts in which facilitation is
highly sensitive to similarity (McRae & Boivert, 1998). The prime concept consists of fea-
tures that are essentially turned fully on or off after settling. Therefore, features of the prime
that are not possessed by the target slow activation of the target concept because they are
difficult to de-activate. Even if the prime and target share a moderate number of features,
facilitation is dampened because of inhibition due to mismatching features. In contrast, if
there is a high degree of featural overlap between prime and target, then there are few prime
features that need to be de-activated while computing the target concept. Thus, a substantial
influence of the degree of similarity is obtained for pairs of basic-level concepts in both
humans and the model.
In summary, due to the relative difficulty of changing the activations of units that are acti-
vated virtually to one or zero (as in basic-level primes) versus the relative ease of changing
activations that are on the steep section of the sigmoidal function (as in superordinate
primes), the influence of prime-target similarity is much more pronounced in basic-level to
basic-level priming. This aspect of the temporal dynamics of the computation of word
meaning, in combination with quantitative differences between computed superordinate ver-
sus basic-level concepts, explains the results regarding the seemingly contradictory influ-
ences of similarity. Thus, offline measures of similarity do not provide the entire picture.
Understanding the richness of the relevant results requires consideration of the temporal
dynamics of similarity.
7. General discussion
Our experiments and simulations demonstrate that a number of interesting empirical
semantic memory phenomena can be simulated using a model with a single representational
layer, that is, without an implemented hierarchical structure. The model learned basic-level
and superordinate concepts by treating both types similarly, as distributed sets of features in a
flat attractor network. It computed reasonable superordinate representations and distinguished
between category members versus nonmembers. In Simulation 1 and Experiment 1, the model
accounted for an offline measure of the graded structure of categories, typicality ratings. In
Simulation 2 and Experiment 2, the activations of superordinate features predicted feature ver-
ification latencies. Simulation 3 provided novel insight into counter-intuitive results regarding
superordinate semantic priming by combining quantitative differences between superordinate
and basic-level featural activations with the computational dynamics of similarity.
Thus, our model is an advance over past models of semantic memory in a few important
ways. For example, neither family resemblance, considered the gold standard for assessing
the structure of natural categories for decades, nor explicit superordinate representations,
had been implemented in a learning system. Our model learns superordinate representations
that have family resemblance-like structure, and it performs comparably to family resem-
blance when assessing typicality. Possibly of greatest import, our model allowed for these
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representational issues to be studied in conjunction with processing dynamics, and thus the
computation of superordinates over time.
7.1. Commonalities and differences between basic-level and superordinate concepts
A central theoretical assumption underlying our modeling is that all learned concepts,
regardless of their putative ‘‘level,’’ are treated similarly in many respects. Every concept
was learned by presenting the model with the name for a class of entities or objects, and
pairing it with an instance of that category on each learning trial, just as a human would
have numerous labeled perceptual experiences. In this sense, our training regime is a direct
statement about how people learn. For superordinates such as fruit and furniture, people do
not develop representations by being explicitly taught that ‘‘an apple is a fruit’’; rather, inci-
dental, implicit learning is key. Labeling plays a critical role in this process. As Brown
(1958) aptly states, ‘‘the child’s vocabulary is more immediately determined by the naming
practices of adults’’ (p. 18). Furthermore, as has been demonstrated in recent investigations
of conceptual development (Plunkett et al., 2007), labels are useful pointers to concepts only
when they cohere with semantic structure already present in the environment. Thus, despite
equivalence in the principles underlying the learning and computation of both superordinate
and basic-level concepts (and all those in between), the model and humans arrive at repre-
sentations for these concepts that differ in important ways.
One such way is that the patterns of feature activations in the model systematically vary,
and we believe this has a direct correspondence in humans. There are clear representational
differences between (many of the) superordinate concepts, such as furniture, and the basic-
level concepts, such as chair, whereby the degree of featural overlap of the exemplars denoted
by the category names differs markedly. For example, there are considerably more shared fea-
tures (and stronger correlations among them) among armchairs, rocking chairs, and kitchen
chairs that comprise the category chair, than among tables, beds, and cabinets that comprise
furniture. Of course, specific instances of a subordinate category such as rocking chair are
even more similar to one another. That is, some words are used consistently to point out bun-
dles of features that, taken together, form relatively concrete and imageable object representa-
tions. Some other words, paired with a more varied set of perceptual instances, can be used to
highlight important subsets of features that appear consistently together across objects. There-
fore, the semantic system must ascertain which subsets are being referred to by the label. The
result is that for many superordinate labels, the features are more varied in activation state than
are the features activated by a basic-level label. One consequence of this is that these superor-
dinates are considerably less imageable and thus might be considered as somewhat abstract.
An extension of this view is that the model naturally learns concepts for which their level
in a purported hierarchy is unclear. For example, the model developed a representation for
bird that fell between superordinates like furniture and basic levels like chair, in that bird
had numerous features that were, more or less, fully activated, as well as some with inter-
mediate activations. This occurred even though the training procedure for bird was identical
to all other superordinates. Interestingly, bird is one concept that has sometimes been identi-
fied as a basic-level concept, and at other times as a superordinate (Rosch et al., 1976). This
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underscores Randall’s (1976) argument that people do not care about the ‘‘level’’ in the
naming hierarchy at which a label might be described as residing.
Obviating the need for a strict taxonomy also removes any potential problems with the
facts that many concepts do not belong to any category (such as ashtray), whereas numerous
others are exemplars of multiple categories, such as knife. During learning of any type of
object concept, a perceived entity (or set of entities) is present, echoing Randall’s (1976)
assertion that the physical features of an object play a key role in learning, regardless of
how they do, or do not, fit into any purported hierarchy.
Differences in activation levels also provided insight into superordinate to basic-level
priming. Along with the model’s temporal dynamics of its computations, these differences
enabled understanding the seemingly inconsistent results regarding superordinate to basic-
level priming, typicality ratings, and priming between two basic-level concepts in both the
model and humans.
7.2. Neural representation
We believe that our model is more consistent with what is known about the neural repre-
sentation of concepts than is the idea of hierarchical representation. It is widely accepted
that knowledge of object concepts is represented across multiple modality-specific brain
regions (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Martin, 2007). For example, visual informa-
tion is stored in regions that are distinct from those that store information about taste, sound,
or an object’s function. Modality-specific regions were not implemented in our model,
although there is no reason why they could not be (see Cree & McRae’s, 2003, brain region
feature classification scheme). If they were, then one possibility is that superordinate con-
cepts are distributed across precisely the same regions as basic-level concepts, in the way
that they share representational units in the model. The main difference would be the level
of activation of the assemblies of neurons involved, resulting from the degree to which regu-
larities exist for information within any modality. Although not a driving force for our
research, this type of model maximizes cognitive economy.
On the other hand, it could be that the anterior temporal pole, an area argued to be a high-
level convergence zone, might function much like the superordinate levels of a hierarchical
representational system, with lower level knowledge being distributed across modality-
specific pathways (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). Note, however, that this type of
hierarchy would fundamentally differ from that of Collins and Quillian (1969), in that all
feature-based knowledge would be stored at the lower levels, and a strict taxonomic
hierarchy would not be transparently implemented.
7.3. General features
One argument against using feature norms is that features common to a large number of
concepts often are not listed, even though participants are aware of them. Participants sel-
dom list features such as a bear <has a heart> and <is alive>, or that a car <is built in a fac-
tory> and <is owned by people>. Instead, they are biased toward producing distinguishing
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rather than shared features because distinguishing information disambiguates a concept
from other similar concepts (McRae et al., 2005). Thus, our model did not contain those
general features.
One issue, therefore, is whether their omission influenced our results in a systematic man-
ner. It seems that a lack of general features should have little influence or might be detri-
mental. For example, adding <has veins> and <has eyes> to all animals should not change
the predictability of graded structure. It would presumably increase the similarity of all ani-
mal exemplars to their superordinate, but the relative differences in superordinate–exemplar
similarity would remain. Another way to think about this is that such general features may
play little role in tasks such as typicality rating because all category members share them.
The same argument can be made for the priming simulations. If all exemplars of a category
include additional shared features with their superordinate prime, it should facilitate the
processing of low- and high-typicality exemplars equally.
7.4. Model architecture
One aspect of the model’s architecture that was somewhat atypical is that it did not
include a hidden layer in which patterns of activation are taken as abstracted representations
(Plaut, 2002; Rumelhart & Todd, 1993). We avoided using a hidden layer to obviate any
possible argument that our model might actually be encoding different ‘‘levels’’ of abstrac-
tion in those units. We suspect that using a hidden layer would not qualitatively change the
results of our simulations because semantic regularities and the influence of label-concept
pairings would continue to determine what the network learns.
7.5. Conclusions
Our research demonstrates that it is not necessary to explicitly implement a hierarchy to
produce behavior that appears to be hierarchically driven. Thus, the idea of a hierarchy
might be best thought of as descriptive of behavior, rather than being literally applicable to
mental representation (i.e., an emergent phenomenon). Our approach also avoids issues that
arise when researchers attempt to apply a strict hierarchy on sets of concepts that actually
do not form such a hierarchy. Most pertinent to this special issue, we used an attractor net-
work that enabled studying the temporal dynamics of the computation of various types of
concepts. This led to Jeff Elman’s suggestion to highlight the theoretical import of what he
coined ‘‘the dynamics of similarity.’’
Notes
1. Other similar proportions (e.g., 75% basic-level concepts, 25% superordinates) were
tested and there were no notable changes in superordinate or basic-level representations.
2. Spearman’s nonparametric rank-order correlations were also computed as a reliability
check because it is less sensitive than Pearson’s product-moment correlations to
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outliers. The only notable difference was that Spearman’s correlation between cosine
and typicality was nonsignificant for musical instruments. Furthermore, visual inspec-
tion of the 20 scatterplots revealed two obvious outliers (lamp in furniture, and porcu-
pine in carnivore). With these points removed, the Pearson correlation for furniture
was .45, p = .052, and for carnivore was .51, p < .02.
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Appendix A: Superordinate categories and their basic-level exemplars. Other basic-
level concepts were trained in the model but were not part of any superordinate
category
Superordinate Basic-Level Exemplars
animal (133) alligator, bat (animal), bear, beaver, beetle, bison, blackbird, bluejay,
budgie, buffalo, bull, butterfly, buzzard, calf, camel, canary, caribou, cat,
caterpillar, catfish, cheetah, chickadee, chicken, chimp, chipmunk, clam,
cockroach, cougar, cow, coyote, crab, crocodile, crow, deer, dog, dolphin,
donkey, dove, duck, eagle, eel, elephant, elk, emu, falcon, fawn, finch,
flamingo, fox, frog, giraffe, goat, goldfish, goose, gopher, gorilla,
groundhog, guppy, hamster, hare, hawk, hornet, horse, hyena, iguana,
lamb, leopard, lion, lobster, mackerel, mink, minnow, mole (animal),
moose, moth, mouse, nightingale, octopus, oriole, ostrich, otter, owl, ox,
panther, parakeet, partridge, peacock, pelican, penguin, perch, pheasant,
pig, pigeon, platypus, pony, porcupine, pigeon, rabbit, raccoon, rat,
rattlesnake, raven, robin, rooster, salamander, salmon, seagull, seal, sheep,
shrimp, skunk, snail, sparrow, spider, squid, squirrel, starling, stork, swan,
tiger, toad, tortoise, trout, tuna, turkey, turtle, vulture, walrus, wasp, whale,
woodpecker, worm, zebra
704 C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009)
Appendix A
(Continued)
Superordinate Basic-Level Exemplars
appliance (14) blender, dishwasher, drill, fan (appliance), freezer, fridge, kettle,
microwave, mixer, oven, radio, stove, telephone, toaster
bird (39) blackbird, bluejay, budgie, buzzard, canary, chickadee, chicken, crow,
dove, duck, eagle, emu, falcon, finch, flamingo, goose, hawk, nightingale,
oriole, ostrich, owl, parakeet, partridge, peacock, pelican, penguin,
pheasant, pigeon, raven, robin, rooster, seagull, sparrow, starling, stork,
swan, turkey, vulture, woodpecker
carnivore (19) alligator, bear, buzzard, cheetah, cougar, coyote, crocodile, dog, eagle,
falcon, fox, hawk, hyena, leopard, lion, panther, porcupine, tiger, vulture
clothing (39) apron, belt, blouse, boots, bra, camisole, cap (hat), cape, cloak, coat, dress,
earmuffs, gloves, gown, hose (leggings), jacket, jeans, leotards, mink
(coat), mittens, nightgown, nylons, pajamas, pants, parka, robe, scarf,
shawl, shirt, shoes, skirt, slippers, socks, sweater, swimsuit, tie, trousers,
veil, vest
container (14) ashtray, bag, barrel, basket, bin (waste), bottle, box, bucket, freezer, jar,
mug, pot, sack, urn
fish (11) catfish, cod, goldfish, guppy, mackerel, minnow, perch, salmon, sardine,
trout, tuna
fruit (29) apple, avocado, banana, blueberry, cantaloupe, cherry, coconut, cranberry,
grape, grapefruit, honeydew, lemon, lime, mandarin, nectarine, olive,
orange, peach, pear, pineapple, plum, prune, pumpkin, raisin, raspberry,
rhubarb, strawberry, tangerine, tomato
furniture (15) bed, bench, bookcase, bureau, cabinet, chair, couch, desk, dresser, lamp,
rocker, shelves, sofa, stool (furniture), table
herbivore (18) buffalo, caribou, cow, deer, elk, fawn, giraffe, gopher, grasshopper, hare,
moose, otter, ox, porcupine, sheep, skunk, squirrel, turtle
insect (13) ant, beetle, butterfly, caterpillar, cockroach, flea, grasshopper, hornet,
housefly, moth, spider, wasp, worm
mammal (57) bat (animal), bear, beaver, bison, buffalo, bull, calf, camel, caribou, cat,
cheetah, chimp, chipmunk, cougar, cow, coyote, deer, dog, dolphin,
donkey, elephant, elk, fawn, fox, giraffe, goat, gopher, gorilla, groundhog,
hamster, hare, horse, hyena, lamb, leopard, lion, mink, moose, mouse,
otter, ox, panther, pig, platypus, pony, porcupine, rabbit, raccoon, rat, seal,
sheep, skunk, squirrel, tiger, walrus, whale, zebra
musical instrument (18) accordion, bagpipe, banjo, cello, clarinet, drum, flute, flute, guitar,
harmonica, harp, harpsichord, keyboard (musical), piano, saxophone,
trombone, trumpet, tuba, violin
pet (22) bat (animal), budgie, canary, cat, chickadee, dog, finch, goldfish, guppy,
hamster, hare, iguana, mink, mouse, parakeet, pigeon, pony, python,
rabbit, rat, salamander, turtle
predator (17) alligator, cat, cheetah, cougar, coyote, eagle, falcon, fox, hawk, hyena,
leopard, lion, mink, owl, panther, tiger, vulture
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Superordinate Basic-Level Exemplars
tool (34) axe, bolts, broom, brush, chain, chisel, clamp, comb, corkscrew, crowbar,
drill, fork, hammer, hatchet, hoe, ladle, level, microscope, paintbrush,
pencil, pliers, rake, sandpaper, scissors, screwdriver, screws, shovel,
sledgehammer, spade, spear, stick, tomahawk, wheelbarrow, wrench
utensil (22) bowl, broom, colander, corkscrew, cup, dish, fork, grater, hatchet, knife,
ladle, mixer, mug, paintbrush, pan, pen, pencil, pot, spatula, spoon,
strainer, tongs
vegetable (31) asparagus, avocado, beans, beets, broccoli, cabbage, carrot, cauliflower,
celery, corn, cucumber, eggplant, garlic, lettuce, mushroom, olive, onions,
parsley, peas, pepper, pickle, potato, pumpkin, radish, rhubarb, rice,
spinach, tomato, turnip, yam, zucchini
vehicle (27) airplane, ambulance, bike, boat, bus, canoe, car, cart, dunebuggy,
helicopter, jeep, motorcycle, sailboat, scooter, ship, skateboard,
submarine, tank (army), tractor, trailer, train, tricycle, trolley, truck, van,
wagon, yacht
weapon (39) armor, axe, bat (baseball), baton, bayonet, bazooka, belt, bomb, bow
(weapon), cannon, catapult, crossbow, crowbar, dagger, grenade, gun,
hammer, harpoon, hatchet, hoe, knife, machete, missile, pistol, revolver,
rifle, rock, rocket, shield, shotgun, shovel, sledgehammer, slingshot, spear,
stick, stone, sword, tomahawk, whip
Appendix B: Superordinate concept-feature pairs used in feature verification
(Experiment 2 and Simulation 2)
Superordinate Feature Feature Type (Wu & Barsalou, 2008)
appliance is hot Internal surface property
used for cooking Function
is electrical Internal surface property
bird builds nests Entity behavior
lays eggs Entity behavior
has feathers External component
carnivore lives in forests Location
is fast Systemic property
has a tail External component
clothing made of cotton Made of
worn for warmth Function
different colors External surface property
container used for carrying things Function
has a lid External component
made of plastic Made of
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Appendix B
(Continued)
Superordinate Feature Feature Type (Wu & Barsalou, 2008)
fish lives in lakes Location
is smelly External surface property
swims Entity behavior
fruit has a pit Internal component
tastes good Internal surface property
tastes sweet Internal surface property
furniture used for relaxing Function
has drawers Internal component
made of wood Made of
herbivore has horns External component
eats grass Entity behavior
has 4 legs External component
insect lives in the ground Location
crawls Entity behavior
is small External surface property
mammal has legs External component
eats Entity behavior
is brown External surface property
pet lives in cages Location
has a long tail External component
flies Entity behavior
predator hunts Entity behavior
has claws External component
has eyes External component
tool used for carpentry Function
has a handle External component
made of metal Made of
utensil is long External surface property
is round External surface property
found in kitchens Location
vegetable is crunchy Internal surface property
is nutritious Systemic property
is edible Function
vehicle is loud External surface property
has an engine Internal component
used for transportation Function
weapon is sharp External surface property
used for war Function
used for killing Function
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Appendix C: Prime–target pairs for superordinate priming (Experiment 3 and
Simulation 3)
Typicality
Superordinate Prime
Related Unrelated Exemplar Target
High appliance mammal toaster
bird vehicle budgie
carnivore utensil crocodile
clothing bird jacket
container appliance bucket
fruit container pear
furniture insect bookcase
insect weapon beetle
mammal tool donkey
tool fruit hammer
utensil carnivore spoon
vegetable clothing spinach
vehicle vegetable car
weapon furniture knife
Low appliance mammal radio
bird vehicle penguin
carnivore utensil dog
clothing bird gloves
container appliance basket
fruit container coconut
furniture insect bench
insect weapon flea
mammal tool chipmunk
tool fruit brush
utensil carnivore mixer
vegetable clothing mushroom
vehicle vegetable airplane
weapon furniture rocket
708 C. M. O’Connor, G. S. Cree, K. McRae ⁄Cognitive Science 33 (2009)
